1. The definition of an act in terms of morality may not be the same as the definition of the act as an external action.
For example, in two cases of someone killing another human person, the external act may be exactly the same, e.g. stabbing the person with a knife. But the one case may be murder, which is intrinsically evil, and the other case may be self-defense, which is moral. So the external act alone is not sufficient to define the act in terms of morality.
2. Often the definition of an act in terms of morality is not the same as its secular or legal definition. Stealing is intrinsically evil, but if the act is not properly defined as stealing, then it may be moral, even if it is certainly stealing under a mere legal or secular definition. In such cases, the act is called expropriation, not stealing.
For example, if you and your family are starving, and a wealthy person nearby has an excess of food, then it may be moral for you to take what you need from them, without harming them, without depriving them of any necessities, so that you and your family can survive. This would be stealing under any legal or secular definition. And stealing is intrinsically evil and always immoral. But the Church teaches that the goods of this world belong first to God, and that these goods are intended by God for the good of all. And so, in certain cases, an act of taking the necessities of life from someone who has an excess is not defined as stealing in moral terms, and may be morally permissible.
3. Now contraception is intrinsically evil because conception is the inherent aim of sexual intercourse. But for the very same reason, an intervention to prevent conception in cases of rape (e.g. use of spermicides) does not meet the definition of contraception in moral terms.
For example, withdrawal is one type of immoral contraception (cf. Gen 38:9). But if someone interrupts an rape that is in progress, this interruption of the rape is moral and is not contraception in moral terms. It is moral to interrupt a rape, because the act of interrupting is not a contraceptive act, but a moral act based on the positive precept requiring one to assist a neighbor in need.
Now since sexual intercourse is inherently aimed at conception, an intervention to prevent conception in cases of rape is an interruption of the rape in terms of morality and is not contraception per se. For the progress toward conception is a continuation of, and an inherent part of, the act of sexual intercourse (which in this case is also rape). Therefore, such an intervention (e.g. use of spermicides) is not contraception per se and is moral.
4. Similarly, NFP may seem to meet a worldly definition of contraception, especially when used, for a grave reason, to attempt to avoid all conception. But it does not meet the definition of contraception in terms of morality, because the sexual act is still open to life.
Therefore, in judging the morality of external acts, we must be careful to properly define the act in terms of morality, and not in terms of a secular or legal definition.
5. Now some persons have concluded that the use of contraception in cases of rape is moral, but they reached this conclusion based on the following false and heretical claim: that the papal encyclical Humanae Vitae, and Church teaching in general, only prohibits use of contraception within marriage.
Now obviously Pope Paul VI, when he wrote Humanae Vitae, understood that sexual relations is only moral within marriage. For the Universal Magisterium has always clearly and definitively taught that sexual relations outside of marriage is immoral. And this is evident in the encyclical, which naturally addresses itself to married couples. But this does not imply that one can morally use contraception outside of marriage. Nor is the teaching of the Church on contraception based solely on one papal encyclical. Rather, the teaching that contraception is intrinsically evil is a teaching of the Universal Magisterium. Therefore, the exact wording of any one encyclical on the topic is irrelevant. The Church universally teaches that contraception is intrinsically evil, and that all intrinsically evil acts are always immoral. Therefore, contraception is immoral regardless of whether the couple is married or not because intrinsically evil acts are immoral regardless of circumstance or intention.
Furthermore, it is absurd to say that adding the sin of fornication to the sin of contraception makes the latter no longer a sin. This kind of thinking shows either a very poor understanding of the basic moral teachings of the Church, or a very rich intellectual dishonesty. It is factually false, disingenuous, and untenable to claim that Humanae Vitae only prohibits contraception within marriage, and not outside of marriage. It is like saying that rape is only rape if the woman is married, or like saying that rape is not rape within marriage. The circumstance of marriage is not what makes contraception immoral.
Conclusion
Contraception is intrinsically evil and always immoral, because sexual intercourse is inherently aimed at conception. But for the same reason, the use of an intervention to prevent conception in cases of rape is not contraception per se. The progress toward conception is an inherent part of the rape, and so it is moral to interrupt the rape with an intervention to prevent conception.
by Ronald L. Conte Jr.
November 25, 2007
